

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT TACOMA

MAYLONI KING,

Plaintiff,

v.

WASHINGTON HEALTH BENEFIT
EXCHANGE, a public-private partnership
created pursuant to RCW 43.71,

Defendant.

Case No. 3:17-cv-5880

**COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
AND
JURY DEMAND**

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, MAYLONI KING (“MAYLONI”), by and through her attorneys of record, STEPHANIE STOCKER and HENDERSON LAW GROUP, PLLC, and states her cause of action against the Defendant, as follows:

I. NATURE OF THE CASE

1.1 This is an action brought by Plaintiff MAYLONI against her former employer, Defendant Washington Health Benefit Exchange (“WHBE”), for unlawful employment practices as follows:

A. DISCRIMINATION BASED ON DISABILITY IN VIOLATION OF:

- RCW 49.60 (WA Law Against Discrimination) (“WLAD”); and

- 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990) (“ADA”).

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B. FAILURE TO ACCOMMODATE DISABILITY IN VIOLATION OF:

- RCW 49.60 (WLAD); and
- 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (ADA).
- DISCRIMINATION BASED ON SEX (PREGNANCY) IN VIOLATION OF: RCW 49.60 (WLAD); and
- 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, *et. seq.* (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, *as amended*) (“Title VII”).

C. RETALIATION IN VIOLATION OF:

- RCW 49.60 (Discrimination Against Person Opposing Unfair Practice Protected by WLAD); and
- 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (Discrimination Against Person Opposing Unfair Practice protected by Title VII).

1.2 This action seeks to provide relief to Plaintiff MAYLONI, who was adversely affected by such practices.

II. PARTIES

2.1 At all times material herein, Plaintiff MAYLONI has been a female residing in Pierce County, State of Washington. At all times material herein, Plaintiff MAYLONI was an employee within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-(f) and RCW 49.60.040.

2.2 At all times material herein, Plaintiff MAYLONI has been diagnosed with epilepsy, a protected disability as defined by RCW 49.60.040(7) and the ADA (42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213). Under the ADA, an impairment like epilepsy that is episodic or in remission is a disability, as it would substantially limit a major life activity when active. 29 C.F.R. §1630.3(j)(1)(vii). Plaintiff is protected from discrimination based on her disability pursuant

1 to the WLAD (RCW 49.60) and the ADA (42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213).

2 2.3 At all relevant times herein, Defendant WHBE was an employer within the
3 meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-(b) and RCW 49.60.040(11). RCW 49.60 applies to
4 employers in Washington State with eight or more employees and therefore applies to
5 Defendant. Title VII and the ADA apply to employers with 15 or more employees, including
6 state and local governments, and therefore applies to Defendant. WHBE was created in 2011
7 by WA State statute (RCW 43.71) as a quasi-governmental, “public-private partnership.”
8 RCW 43.71. WHBE was charged with exercising functions delineated in Chapter 43.71
9 RCW and operating consistent with the federal Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of
10 2010, P.L. 111-148 (as amended by the federal Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act
11 of 2010, P.L. 111-152 and regulations/guidance issued thereunder) (appointed pursuant to
12 RCW 43.71.020(1)). WHBE is responsible for the operation of Washington Healthplanfinder,
13 an online marketplace for WA State individuals and WA State families to find, compare and
14 enroll in Qualified Health Plans, Qualified Dental Plans and Washington Apple Health
15 (Medicaid).
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19 **III. PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS**

20 3.1 Plaintiff MAYLONI filed a timely charge of discrimination with the Equal
21 Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and brings this action within ninety (90)
22 days of receipt of her Notice of Right to Sue (received by Plaintiff MAYLONI’s attorney on
23 July 31, 2017).
24

25 **IV. JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

26 4.1 All acts and omissions alleged to have occurred herein took place in Thurston
27 County, Washington. This court has subject matter jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28

1 U.S.C. §1331, which gives district courts jurisdiction over all civil actions arising under the
2 Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States.

3 4.2 This court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action under 42 U.S.C.
4 § 2000e-5(f)(3) and 42 U.S.C. §12101-12213.
5

6 4.3 The employment practices alleged to be unlawful were committed within the
7 jurisdiction of the United State District Court for the District of Western Washington; venue is
8 proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2).
9

10 **V. STATEMENT OF FACTS**

11 5.1 Plaintiff MAYLONI was hired by WHBE on November 8, 2013 as a Document
12 Management Specialist. She quickly exceeded expectations and was promoted on March 14,
13 2014 to an Eligibility Program Specialist. Plaintiff MAYLONI consistently performed at or
14 above expectations throughout her employment with WHBE. She consistently arrived early
15 to work, stayed late, took on additional job duties as needed, and made herself available to
16 answer questions for un-trained and under-trained staff.
17

18 5.2 Plaintiff MAYLONI suffers from epilepsy, diagnosed at age three. She
19 experienced seizures at ages three, five, seventeen, and then several seizures of increasing
20 severity at work and home during the years she was employed by WHBE. Prior to working at
21 WHBE, Plaintiff MAYLONI was able to manage her debilitating epilepsy symptoms through
22 medication and lifestyle choices, as recommended by her doctor. However, her doctor
23 recognized that the consistent high levels of workplace stress forced upon Plaintiff
24 MAYLONI as a result of WHBE's repeated discriminatory and retaliatory treatment towards
25 her, directly resulted in the increased frequency and severity of her seizures, according to her
26 treating physician.
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1 5.3 On May 19, 2014, Plaintiff MAYLONI announced her pregnancy to her WHBE
2 supervisor, Eligibility Manager, Ms. Natoshia Erickson. The following week, Ms. Erickson
3 conducted interviews for an additional Eligibility Specialist position, stating to Plaintiff
4 MAYLONI that the purpose of the additional role was to provide the option of working from
5 home for “maternity related absences.” Plaintiff MAYLONI was very interested in working
6 from home during her pregnancy and maternity leave in order to more easily schedule her
7 epilepsy and pregnancy-related doctor appointments, while maintaining her consistently
8 positive work performance in her position with WHBE. Plaintiff MAYLONI communicated
9 to WHBE her interest in utilizing the work-from-home policy in the office.
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12 5.4 On June 30, 2014, Plaintiff MAYLONI’s father passed away. She took leave
13 for three days, following the standard bereavement policy of WHBE. Two months later, her
14 husband was hospitalized and underwent major surgery. She advised Ms. Erickson and
15 WHBE Human Resources Manager, Nancy Steele, of her husband’s medical condition and
16 recovery requirements – Plaintiff MAYLONI was her husband’s primary caregiver during his
17 recovery. During this time, Plaintiff MAYLONI exhausted her allotted Paid Time Off
18 (“PTO”) with WHBE in order to provide care for her ailing husband. Ms. Erickson required
19 Plaintiff MAYLONI to produce doctor’s notes for every absence beyond her PTO,
20 untruthfully stating to Plaintiff MAYLONI that this was a new “standard” WHBE employee
21 policy (Ms. Erickson later recanted this statement after her untruthfulness and discriminatory
22 singling-out of Plaintiff MAYLONI was discovered by WHBE through its investigation
23 following discrimination/retaliation claims brought by Plaintiff MAYLONI). WHBE did not
24 fire non-disabled Ms. Erickson after discovering her blatant lies told to Plaintiff MAYLONI
25 re WHBE leave policy. WHBE later terminated disabled, pregnant, consistently top-
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1 performing Plaintiff MAYLONI with zero incidents of ethics concern or work performance
2 issues.

3 5.5 On December 1, 2014, Plaintiff MAYLONI requested information regarding the
4 possibility of working from home for a short period of time prior to taking maternity leave in
5 order to accommodate her pregnancy-related and epilepsy-related doctor's appointments. Ms.
6 Erickson denied Plaintiff MAYLONI's request and replied that there were simply "too many
7 challenges." At the same time, however, Ms. Erickson was allowing other employees, Ms.
8 Raven Castro and Mr. Mathew Holloman, considerable flexibility to work from home on a
9 consistent and ongoing basis. Ms. Raven Castro and Mr. Mathew Holloman were both
10 outside of Plaintiff MAYLONI's protected classes (*i.e.*, unlike Plaintiff MAYLONI, both Ms.
11 Raven Castro and Mr. Mathew Holloman were non-disabled and not pregnant).

12 5.6 Later that week, Ms. Erickson advised Plaintiff MAYLONI via email that
13 because she had exhausted her PTO, used negative-40 PTO, and received donated PTO, any
14 further absences would be unpaid. According to Ms. Erickson, Plaintiff MAYLONI had
15 exhausted any and all options for leave due to her FMLA-qualifying legitimate family health
16 issues over the past year and now faced a significant loss of income immediately following
17 the birth of her first child. Plaintiff MAYLONI continuing to meet or exceed her job
18 expectations for her work with WHBE.

19 5.7 On December 11, 2014, Plaintiff MAYLONI filed a Discrimination and
20 Harassment complaint with Ms. Steele against Ms. Erickson. WHBE opened an investigation
21 to explore the claims brought by Plaintiff MAYLONI.

22 5.8 When interviewed as part of the investigation into Plaintiff MAYLONI's
23 claims, Ms. Steele and HR Generalist, Gerard Buan, confirmed that doctor's notes are not
24

1 required for absences when PTO hours are exceeded, as outlined in the WHBE Employee
2 Handbook. In fact, none of Ms. Erickson's decisions and statements regarding Plaintiff
3 MAYLONI's PTO and working from home were standard policy, as Ms. Erickson had falsely
4 stated when denying Plaintiff MAYLONI leave for FMLA-qualifying legitimate family health
5 issues.
6

7 5.9 When WHBE discussed these findings with Ms. Erickson, Ms. Erickson sent an
8 email in which she changed her position on the leave issues against Plaintiff MAYLONI.
9

10 5.10 In late December 2014, the WHBE "work-from-home" policy was drafted and
11 awaiting approved by Ms. Joanna Donbeck, Associate Director of Operations.

12 5.11 WHBE's work-from-home policy, made effective in early 2015, was in line
13 with Governor's Inslee's EXECUTIVE ORDER 14-02, which was signed/made effective
14 months prior on March 3, 2014, and titled "Expanding Telework and Flexible Work Hours
15 Programs to Help Reduce Traffic Congestion and Improve Quality of Life." In EXECUTIVE
16 ORDER 14-02, Governor Inslee reaffirmed and expanded the WA State Telework and
17 Flexible Work Hours Program, encouraging WA State employers to recognize the benefits of
18 telework and flexible work hours for employees. Order 14-02 states that "studies have shown
19 that employers enjoy economic and organizational benefits resulting from increased employee
20 productivity and morale, reduced use of employee sick leave, reduced hiring and training
21 costs, and reduced office space and parking needs." See EXECUTIVE ORDER 14-02 (March
22 3, 2014) (superseded on June 3, 2016, by Gov. Inslee's EXECUTIVE ORDER 16-07
23 "Building a Modern Work Environment," which further expanded the WA State Telework
24 and Flexible Work Hours Program for WA State employees.
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28 5.12 EXECUTIVE ORDER 14-02 was in place at all times relevant herein, as it was

1 made signed/made effective on March 3, 2014 and remained in effect through June 3, 2016
2 when EXECUTIVE ORDER 16-07 was signed/made effective (6 months after WHBE
3 terminated Plaintiff MAYLONI's employment).

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5 5.13 As Plaintiff MAYLONI hoped to begin working from home Ms. Erickson
6 informed Plaintiff MAYLONI that she would not be allowed to work from home like her co-
7 workers. Such co-workers included Mr. Mathew Holloman and Ms. Raven Castro, both of
8 whom were allowed by WHBE to work from home for multiple reasons, such as not feeling
9 well or their children being sick. WHBE manager, Ms. Erickson, singled-out Plaintiff
10 MAYLONI from her non-disabled and non-pregnant co-workers, denying Plaintiff
11 MAYLONI work-from-home flexibility and forcing Plaintiff MAYLONI to remain working
12 full-time onsite at WHBE to cover the work of a recently-terminated employee. Ms. Erickson
13 made this decision despite that:
14

15 (a) Plaintiff MAYLONI consistently achieved exceptional work performance in
16 her job duties with WHBE;

17
18 (b) Plaintiff MAYLONI was epileptic, known by WHBE management and co-
19 workers, as she had suffered seizures while working alongside her work-mates
20 on the cubicle floor at WHBE offices;

21
22 (c) Plaintiff MAYLONI was in her third trimester of her pregnancy, made more
23 difficult due to her existing epilepsy. Forced by Ms. Erickson to consistently
24 work onsite at WHBE in the open-cubicle team room, MAYLONI's anxiety
25 increased to panic attacks, which caused her to experience increased seizures.

26 On January 2, 2015, MAYLONI was admitted to the hospital for preeclampsia.

27
28 5.14 In November 2014, the minimum salary for Eligibility Specialists was raised by

1 WHBE from \$35,000.00/year to \$40,000.00/year. WHBE informed Plaintiff MAYLONI that
2 her salary would remain at \$40,000.00/year, which was below the new minimum for her role
3 with WHBE. Plaintiff MAYLONI's salary was raised only to the new minimum salary range,
4 while others hired after Plaintiff MAYLONI and with less experience were started by WHBE
5 at the higher salary pay.
6

7 5.15 After making complaints to WHBE about denying her the pay increase for her
8 Eligibility Specialists role, Plaintiff MAYLONI was finally given a pay raise by WHBE on
9 Dec. 30, 2014 to meet the minimum salary for her role with WHBE (backdated to November
10 2014). Plaintiff MAYLONI's salary remained at this pay rate until WHBE terminated her
11 employment on Oct. 15, 2015. Her pay rate was the same as the salary for those WHBE
12 employees who were newly hired and who came to WHBE with no relevant work experience.
13

14 5.16 On January 2, 2015, Plaintiff MAYLONI was unexpectedly admitted to the
15 hospital for severe preeclampsia. When Plaintiff MAYLONI was released from the hospital,
16 she was under strict doctor's orders that she remain on bedrest until the birth of her child in
17 late January 2015. Plaintiff MAYLONI started her unpaid maternity leave earlier than
18 planned to abide by WHBE's strict PTO policy while Plaintiff MAYLONI's co-workers
19 continued enjoying their flexible paid "work-from-home" WHBE schedule.
20

21 5.17 In mid-February 2015, while on maternity leave, but communicating with
22 WHBE regarding her March 2015 return to work, Plaintiff MAYLONI applied and
23 interviewed for two newly available Senior Eligibility Specialist positions at WHBE. As a
24 highly skilled Specialist who had consistently performed Senior Eligibility Specialist job
25 duties with excellent feedback from WHBE regarding her work performance, Plaintiff
26 MAYLONI was uniquely qualified for this role, as compared to her WHBE co-workers.
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1 5.18 In early March 2015, Ms. Erickson informed Plaintiff MAYLONI that the
2 position was offered to two other candidates based on their “experience and demonstrated
3 abilities to perform the functions of this position.” Both candidates had been hired as entry-
4 level “project temps” in the role of Eligibility Specialist in November 2014, and had been
5 trained and directly managed by Plaintiff MAYLONI for the duration of their employment at
6 WHBE. WHBE passed over Plaintiff MAYLONI in favor of co-workers who, unlike her,
7 were not disabled and not on maternity leave
8

9 5.19 When Plaintiff MAYLONI returned from maternity leave on March 30, 2015,
10 her role at the WHBE office had been reduced significantly. Several of her core job
11 responsibilities had been assigned to less experienced co-workers; she had been demoted from
12 “specialist-level” at WHBE (who trained new and less-experienced employees) to “temporary
13 staff-level,” an entry-level position whose core job duty was to work on clearing eligibility
14 back-logs.
15

16 5.20 On March 31, 2015, Plaintiff MAYLONI received a negative Employee Review
17 from WHBE management that downplayed her consistently stellar work performance at
18 WHBE, and included unfounded defamatory statements made about Plaintiff MAYLONI’s
19 ethics as an employee.
20

21 5.21 Plaintiff MAYLONI filed a retaliation complaint against Ms. Erickson, which
22 addressed the retaliatory actions described above and the lack of corrective action taken by
23 WHBE after her first complaints to WHBE regarding being singled-out by WHBE in favor of
24 non-disabled and/or non-pregnant co-workers. On March 2, 2015, Ms. Erickson announced
25 that she was moving to a new position within WHBE (“Business Analyst”) and that Plaintiff
26 MAYLONI’s new supervisor was going to be Ms. Joanna Donbeck.
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1 5.22 On April 9, 2015, Plaintiff MAYLONI met with Ms. Steele and Ms. Donbeck to
2 discuss her complaints of retaliation and discrimination filed against WHBE management.
3 She was informed that WHBE had conducted an investigation that consisted of a meeting with
4 Ms. Erickson, without Plaintiff's participation. On April 9, 2015 Nancy Steele dismissed
5 Plaintiff MAYLONI's grievances and closed the investigation, providing MAYLONI
6 documentation of Ms. Erickson's responses to MAYLONI's list of grievances. WHBE
7 management stated that the reason they did not promote Plaintiff MAYLONI to either of the
8 available Senior Eligibility Specialist roles open in February 2015, was the negative
9 Employee Review Plaintiff MAYLONI received immediately after her return from maternity
10 leave on March 31, 2015.

13 5.23 Through the spring of 2015, Plaintiff MAYLONI continued to excel at her job
14 duties for WHBE. Working onsite every day, as required by WHBE, Plaintiff MAYLONI
15 focused on her work, striving to ignore that her epilepsy symptoms began to worsen,
16 including severe anxiety and workplace seizures. During these months in the spring of 2015,
17 WHBE allowed the new Senior Eligibility Specialists who were hired in lieu of Plaintiff
18 MAYLONI (Mr. Jon Rambo and Ms. Raven Castro, both of whom were not disabled) to have
19 work-from-home flexibility in their schedules.

22 5.24 In June 2015, with the worsening of her epilepsy symptoms (including severe
23 anxiety and workplace seizures) and at the directive from her treating physician, Plaintiff
24 MAYLONI applied for full-time work-from-home accommodation under the Americans with
25 Disabilities Act (ADA) from WHBE. Plaintiff MAYLONI's full-time work-from-home
26 accommodation was approved by WHBE on July 7, 2015, and her accommodation became
27 effective that same day.
28

1 5.25 Plaintiff MAYLONI's work-from-home ADA accommodation starting July 7,
2 2015 was proven successful for both Plaintiff MAYLONI and WHBE:

3 (a) Plaintiff MAYLONI's epilepsy symptoms were better managed as a result of
4 her work-from-home ADA accommodation, as attested by Plaintiff
5 MAYLONI's treating physician in ADA paperwork submitted to WHBE on
6 June 9, 2015, and again on Oct. 1, 2015.

7 (b) With her ADA accommodation in place and her epilepsy symptoms better
8 managed, Plaintiff MAYLONI'S work performance for WHBE improved
9 beyond her established positive work performance at WHBE. Plaintiff
10 MAYLONI'S work productivity, accuracy and efficiency increased as a result
11 of the accommodation.

12 5.26 Plaintiff MAYLONI consistently performed the essential functions of her job
13 for WHBE. In an "ADA Follow-Up Meeting" on August 13, 2015, WHBE manager Joanna
14 Donbeck provided a positive job review that MAYLONI was more productive since working
15 from home under ADA accommodation.

16 5.27 When Plaintiff MAYLONI learned that she was pregnant with her second
17 child, she shared this news with WHBE via a letter mailed and emailed by her attorney.

18 Page 4 of that letter clearly states that "we herein inform WHBE that Plaintiff MAYLONI is
19 pregnant with her second child, due March 16, 2016."

20 5.28 In response to the Oct. 9, 2015 letter, Nancy Steele scheduled an "ADA
21 interactive process" phone call with MAYLONI to occur on October 15, 2015. Plaintiff
22 MAYLONI informed Nancy Steele that her attorney, Stephanie Stocker, would be joining the
23 conference call, which Nancy Steele agreed to.

24 5.29 On October 15, 2015, Ms. Steele informed MAYLONI that Plaintiff
25 MAYLONI's ADA accommodation was ending immediately. Ms. Steele stated that
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1 MAYLONI's employment was terminated due to a disability separation, effective
2 immediately. A formal letter dated October 15, 2015 to Plaintiff MAYLONI followed
3 confirming that WHBE had terminated Plaintiff MAYLONI's employment because WHBE
4 was "unable to provide reasonable accommodation for your current medical condition(s)."
5

6 **VI. CAUSES OF ACTION**

7 6.1 Plaintiff hereby re-alleges the substance of sections I, II, III, IV, and V with the
8 same force and effect as though fully set forth herein, and apply those facts to each cause of
9 action.
10

11 **FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION**
12 **DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION**
IN VIOLATION OF RCW 49.60 (WLAD)

13 6.2 The WLAD (RCW § 49.60, *et seq.*) is a broad and remedial statute that was
14 originally enacted in 1949 as an employment discrimination law. WA State enacted WLAD
15 15 years before the Civil Rights Act of 1964. WLAD is potent. It contains a sweeping policy
16 statement both denouncing discrimination in a variety of forms and mandating that the law be
17 liberally construed for the accomplishment of the purposes thereof.

18 6.3 The WLAD (RCW 49.60) provides the right to hold employment without
19 discrimination on the basis of disability. RCW 49.60.030(1)(a). The WLAD defines a
20 disability as a:
21

22 1. Sensory, mental or physical impairment that is:

23 (a) Medically cognizable or diagnosable;

24 (b) Exists as a record or history; or

25 (c) Is perceived to exist whether or not it does.
26

27 2. Can be temporary or permanent.

28 3. Can be mitigated or unmitigated by treatment.

1 See RCW 49.60.040(7). Plaintiff MAYLONI's epilepsy, diagnosed and on-going since age
 2 three (3), is a medically diagnosed condition and is thus a protected disability under the
 3 WLAD. As an employee with a legally protected disability pursuant to RCW 49.60.040(7),
 4 Plaintiff was protected by the WLAD (RCW 49.60) from discrimination by her employer,
 5 Defendant.
 6

7 6.4 Under the WLAD, to establish a claim of discrimination on the basis of
 8 disability, a plaintiff has the burden to prove that:

- 9 1. He or she has or is perceived to have a disability;
- 10 2. That he or she is able to perform the essential functions of the job, with
- 11 reasonable accommodation; and
- 12 3. That his or her disability, or the perception of the disability, was a substantial
- 13 factor in the defendant's decision to take an adverse employment action against
- 14 the plaintiff.
- 15
- 16

17 WPI 330.32.

18 6.5 Washington Courts utilize the "substantial factor" test in analyzing
 19 discrimination under the WLAD. The ultimate burden in cases brought under RCW
 20 49.60.180 is to present evidence sufficient for a trier of fact to reasonably conclude that the
 21 alleged unlawfully discriminatory animus was more likely than not a substantial factor in the
 22 adverse employment action. In the absence of direct evidence of discriminatory intent, courts
 23 employ the *McDonnell Douglas* burden-shifting framework to analyze discrimination claims
 24 at the summary judgment stage. *McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green*, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct.
 25 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Under this scheme, the plaintiff first must establish a *prima*
 26 *facie* case. This raises a presumption of discrimination and shifts the burden to the defendant
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1 to show a legitimate non-discriminatory rationale for the employment decision. If the
2 defendant offers such a rationale, the plaintiff must offer evidence that the employer's
3 rationale was actually a pretext for discrimination. These burdens are burdens of production,
4 not persuasion, and they may be proved through direct or circumstantial evidence.
5

6 6.6 Here, Plaintiff MAYLONI meets the three elements required to present a claim
7 of discrimination against Defendant on the basis of her epilepsy disability (symptoms of
8 which were further exacerbated by her second pregnancy, affording her additional protections
9 under the WLAD and ADA):
10

- 11 a. Plaintiff MAYLONI's diagnosed epilepsy (with symptoms exacerbated by her
12 second pregnancy) are a recognized disability under the WLAD;
- 13 b. Plaintiff MAYLONI demonstrated that she was able to perform the essential
14 functions of her job for WHBE with reasonable accommodation. Plaintiff
15 MAYLONI was doing satisfactory work for WHBE and, in fact just prior to her
16 Oct. 15, 2015 termination, had been praised by her WHBE supervisor, Joanna
17 Donbeck, for her exceptional work performance and level of productivity while
18 on her ADA work-from-home accommodation July 7, 2015-Oct. 2015; and
19
- 20 c. Lastly, Plaintiff MAYLONI's disabilities were a substantial factor in the
21 Defendant's decision to take an adverse employment action against her;
22 Plaintiff MAYLONI was discharged under circumstances that raise a reasonable
23 inference of unlawful discrimination. WHBE terminated Plaintiff MAYLONI'S
24 employment just 6 days after learning of Plaintiff MAYLONI's second
25 pregnancy and the exacerbation of her epilepsy symptoms caused by her
26 pregnancy. This comes just after Plaintiff MAYLONI was praised by her
27
28

1 WHBE supervisor, Joanna Donbeck, for her exceptional work performance and
2 level of productivity while on her ADA work-from-home accommodation July
3 7, 2015-Oct. 2015.
4

5 6.7 Additionally, Defendant's stated reason for its discriminatory conduct against
6 Plaintiff MAYLONI (*i.e.*, that she showed poor work performance, citing WHBE's March 31,
7 2015 unfounded/retaliatory negative Employee Review of Plaintiff MAYLONI) – was not the
8 true reason for Defendant's conduct towards her, but rather was mere pretext to hide
9 Defendant's discriminatory animus towards Plaintiff MAYLONI based on her protected
10 disability (symptoms of which were exacerbated by her second protected).
11

12 Damages under WLAD

13 6.8 As a result of Defendant's discriminatory conduct against Plaintiff MAYLONI
14 and the severe emotional distress that Plaintiff MAYLONI suffered as a direct result, Plaintiff
15 MAYLONI is entitled to recover damages under the WLAD. Remedies for violation of the
16 WLAD are broad. The WLAD provides that: Any person deeming himself or herself injured
17 by any act in violation of this chapter shall have a civil action in a court of competent
18 jurisdiction to enjoin further violations, or to recover the actual damages sustained by the
19 person, or both, together with the cost of suit including reasonable attorneys' fees or any other
20 appropriate remedy authorized by this chapter or the United States Civil Rights Act of 1964 as
21 amended... *See* RCW 49.60.030(2). The WLAD provides for an award of compensatory
22 damages, recovery for personal injuries for emotional distress, humiliation, and pain &
23 suffering, attorney's fees and costs.
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SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION IN VIOLATION
OF 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (ADA)

6.9 The Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) (42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213) is a federal mandate that prohibits discrimination against individuals with disabilities in critical areas such as employment, housing, public accommodations, education, and access to public services. *Id.* §12101(a)(3), (b). Title I of the ADA protects employees of employers with 15 or more employees, including state and local governments, and therefore applies to Defendant.

6.10 Plaintiff MAYLONI’s diagnosed epilepsy (ongoing since age 3) is a disability recognized by the ADA. Plaintiff MAYLONI’s two pregnancies while working at WHBE raise additional protections for Plaintiff MAYLONI, including but not limited to her second pregnancy causing the exacerbation of her epilepsy symptoms (as diagnosed by her doctor in summer 2015, ADA paperwork for which was submitted to WHBE on Oct. 1, 2015). While pregnancy itself is not a disability, pregnant workers and job applicants are not excluded from the protections of the ADA. Changes to the definition of the term "disability" resulting from enactment of the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA) make it much easier for pregnant workers with pregnancy-related impairments to demonstrate that they have disabilities for which they may be entitled to a reasonable accommodation under the ADA. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008). The expanded definition of "disability" under the ADA also may affect the PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT (“PDA”) requirement that pregnant workers with limitations be treated the same as employees who are not pregnant but who are similar in their ability or inability to work by expanding the number of nonpregnant employees who could serve as comparators where disparate treatment under the PDA is alleged. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).

6.11 Defendant violated the ADA when they terminated Plaintiff MAYLONI’s employment based on her ADA-recognized epilepsy disability (with further protections for the exacerbation of her epilepsy symptoms due to her second pregnancy—diagnosed by her

1 treating physician). As set forth by the 9th Circuit “Manual of Model Civil Jury Instructions”

2 12.1 ADA EMPLOYMENT ACTIONS—ELEMENTS:

3 “As to the plaintiff’s claim that [his] [her] disability was the reason for the defendant’s
4 decision to [[discharge] [not hire] [not promote] [demote] [*state other adverse action*]]
5 [him] [her], the plaintiff has the burden of proving the following evidence by a
preponderance of the evidence:

- 6 1. The plaintiff has a disability [as defined by the ADA];
- 7 2. The plaintiff was a qualified individual [as defined by the ADA]; and
- 8 3. The plaintiff was discharged ... because of the plaintiff’s disability.

9 If you find that plaintiff has proved all of these elements, your verdict should be for the
10 plaintiff. If, on the other hand, the plaintiff has failed to prove any of these elements,
11 your verdict should be for the defendant.” See 9th Circuit “Manual of Model Civil Jury
Instructions”

12 6.12 Here, Plaintiff MAYLONI meets the above three elements and will prove by a
13 preponderance of the evidence that Defendant violated the ADA when they terminated
14 Plaintiff MAYLONI’s employment based on her disability:

15 Plaintiff MAYLONI has a protected disability as defined by the ADA

16 6.13 Under the ADA, a “disability” is defined as: (A) a physical or mental
17 impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual;
18 (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment. 42
19 U.S.C. §12102(2).

20 6.14 Plaintiff MAYLONI’s epilepsy is a disability protected by the ADA. Plaintiff
21 MAYLONI’s diagnosed epilepsy is protected disability within the meaning of the ADA’s
22 definition of disability because they are “substantially limited in neurological functions and
23 other major life activities” (for example, speaking or interacting with others) when seizures
24 occur. Under the ADA, an impairment like epilepsy that is episodic or in remission is a
25 disability, as it would substantially limit a major life activity when active. 29 C.F.R.
26 §1630.3(j)(1)(vii).

27 6.15 Additionally, because the determination of whether an impairment is a disability
28 is made without regard to the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures, epilepsy is a

1 disability even if medication or surgery limits the frequency or severity of seizures or
 2 eliminates them altogether. The determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a
 3 major life activity shall be made without regard to the ameliorative effects of mitigating
 4 measures. *Id.* at §1630.3(j)(1)(vi). An individual who, because of the use of a mitigating
 5 measure, has experienced no limitations (*e.g.*, seizures), or only minor limitations, related to
 6 the impairment may still be an individual with a disability, where there is evidence that in the
 7 absence of an effective mitigating measure the individual's impairment would be substantially
 8 limiting. *Id.* at Part 1630, app, § 1630.3(j)(1)(vi).

9 6.16 Moreover, an individual like Plaintiff MAYLONI with a past history of epilepsy
 10 (diagnosed at age three) also has a disability within the meaning of the ADA. *Id.* at
 11 §1630.2(k).

12 Plaintiff MAYLONI was a qualified individual as defined by the ADA

13 6.17 Under the ADA, a plaintiff is “qualified” if the plaintiff can show the ability to
 14 perform the essential functions of the job with or without a reasonable accommodation. 42
 15 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A), 12111(8); *Smith v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist.*, 727 F.3d 950, 955 (9th
 16 Cir.2013); *Cooper v. Neiman Marcus Group*, 125 F.3d 786, 790 (9th Cir.1997). A plaintiff
 17 can demonstrate that he is a “qualified individual” by establishing that “a reasonable
 18 accommodation existed that would have enabled him to perform the essential functions of his
 19 former position”. *Kirbyson*, 795 F. Supp. 2d at 942 (N.D. Cal. 2011). Continuous leaves of
 20 absence can be a reasonable accommodation, as long as the periods of absence are not
 21 indefinite. *Humphrey v. Mem’l Hosps. Ass’n*, 239 F.3d 1128 1136 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing to
 22 *Kimbrow v. Atlantic Richfield Co.*, 889 F.2d 869 (9th Cir. 1989), *cert. denied*, 498 U.S. 814,
 23 111 S.Ct. 53 (1990)).

24 6.18 Here, Plaintiff MAYLONI consistently performed the essential functions of her
 25 job for WHBE and, in fact, was proven to do so ***more productively*** during her July-Oct. 2015
 26 work-from-home ADA accommodation, as communicated to Plaintiff MAYLONI by WHBE
 27 manager, Joanna Donbeck, during MAYLONI’s “ADA Follow-Up Meeting” with WHBE on
 28 August 13, 2015.

1 6.19 Additionally, Plaintiff MAYLONI's treating physician instructed WHBE on
 2 June 9, 2015 and again on October 1, 2015, that the best accommodation for Plaintiff
 3 MAYLONI's epilepsy that would result in the most sustained work productivity with the least
 4 effect on the aggravation of her daily epilepsy symptoms was that she work from home. This
 5 was not specific to Plaintiff MAYLONI's inability to drive to and from work, as proffered by
 6 Defendant WHBE, but rather was that Plaintiff MAYLONI working onsite indefinitely at the
 7 WHBE offices would exacerbate and potentially worsen Plaintiff MAYLONI's daily epilepsy
 8 symptoms. As required by WHBE, Plaintiff MAYLONI provided ADA paperwork from her
 9 treating physician, Dr. Au, on June 9, 2015, and again on Oct. 1, 2015, wherein Dr. Au wrote
 10 that:

11 "Plaintiff MAYLONI's disability does not restrict her ability to perform the essential
 12 functions of her job with WHBE as set forth in the attached position description for
 13 Plaintiff MAYLONI's role. Plaintiff MAYLONI having the ability to work from home
 14 will help her to better continue to meet and exceed expectations for her job functions at
 15 WHBE as set forth in the job description."

16 *See* ADA Paperwork signed by Dr. Au on June 9, 2015; *see also* ADA Paperwork signed by
 17 Dr. Au on Oct. 1, 2015, reiterating her recommendation that Plaintiff MAYLONI's
 18 disabilities require that she work from home.

19 6.20 Additionally, Plaintiff MAYLONI was a "qualified individual" under the ADA
 20 because Plaintiff MAYLONI's 100% work-from-home ADA accommodation was not one she
 21 intended to be indefinite. As stated by Plaintiff MAYLONI's physician, Dr. Au, Plaintiff
 22 MAYLONI's epilepsy symptoms grew increasingly more severe after she became pregnant
 23 with her second baby (summer 2015). During the Oct. 15, 2015, ADA "interactive process"
 24 conference call with WHBE's Nancy Steele, Plaintiff MAYLONI requested that WHBE
 25 extend her proven-successful work-from-home accommodation from Oct. 2015-March 2016
 26 (only until her baby was born in March 2016 – just 5 months away), at which time she would
 27 take unpaid maternity leave. Plaintiff MAYLONI further suggested to WHBE that, upon her
 28 return to work after maternity leave, she, WHBE and her treating physician could reassess her
 ADA work-from-home accommodation to determine what days she could return to working

onsite at WHBE.

Plaintiff MAYLONI was discharged by Defendant because of her disability.

6.21 Under the ADA, an employee may present direct or circumstantial evidence that the employment decision was motivated by the employer's discriminatory animus or use the burden-shifting method set forth in *McDonnell Douglas*. The temporal proximity between the announcement of health issues and the adverse action can be sufficient to prove discrimination. *Vale v. Great Neck Water Pollution Control Dist.*, 80 F. Supp. 3d 426, 437 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (denying defendant's dispositive motion when "the Plaintiff alleges that just days after returning to work following the injury, the Defendant modified her job responsibilities, requiring her to perform certain labor-intensive tasks outside the scope of her job classification"); *Phillips v. PacifiCorp*, 304 F. Appx. 527, 530 (9th Cir. 2008) ("As Mortensen had received good performance reviews previously, but received negative reviews and was placed on a performance improvement plan shortly after her discrimination complaint, the proximity alone is enough to establish a causal link").

6.22 Here, WHBE ended Plaintiff MAYLONI's proven-successful ADA work-from-home accommodation and abruptly terminated Plaintiff MAYLONI's employment on October 15, 2015, without discussion (interactive or otherwise) regarding possible alternative accommodations for Plaintiff MAYLONI's epilepsy disability (symptoms of which were exacerbated by her second pregnancy). This was despite WHBE reporting to Plaintiff MAYLONI on August 13, 2015, that her work productivity with WHBE has increased tremendously as a result of the accommodation and that the accommodation was, in Nancy Steele's words, "viewed as a success by the agency."

Damages under the ADA

6.23 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) applies all powers, remedies, and enforcement provisions of Title VII to any persons alleging employment discrimination on the basis of disability. As such, Plaintiff MAYLONI is entitled to and will seek all available remedies under Title VII

1 against Defendant, including but not limited to compensatory damages, punitive damages,
 2 back pay, lost future earnings, attorney's fees, and reasonable expert witness fees. Back pay
 3 consists of wages, salary and fringe benefits the employee would have earned during the
 4 period of discrimination to the date of trial.

5 **THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION**

6 **FAILURE TO ACCOMMODATE DISABILITY IN VIOLATION** 7 **OF WLAD AND ADA**

8 6.24 The WLAD and ADA not only prohibit employers from discriminating against
 9 employees with disabilities; they also require employers to make reasonable accommodations
 10 to allow employees with disabilities to perform their job.

11 **WLAD**

12 6.25 Under the WLAD, a plaintiff must show (1) that he or she is disabled; (2) that
 13 he or she is qualified to perform the essential functions of the job in question; (3) he or she
 14 gave the employer notice of the abnormality and its accompanying substantial imitations; and
 15 (4) upon notice, the employer failed to affirmatively adopt measures that were available to the
 16 employer and medically necessary to accommodate the disability.
 17

18 **ADA**

19 6.26 Under the ADA, a Plaintiff must show the following four elements to prove that
 20 an employer failed to accommodate their disability in violation of the ADA:
 21

- 22 a. The employee has a disability as defined by the ADA;
- 23 b. The employee informed the employer of his or her condition and requested an
- 24 accommodation;
- 25 c. There was an accommodation available that would have been effective and
- 26 would not have posed an undue hardship to the employer. "Generalized
- 27 conclusions [from the employer] will not suffice to support a claim of undue
- 28 hardship." 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. §1630.15(d) (1996). "Instead, undue
- hardship must be based on an individualized assessment of current

1 circumstances that show that a specific reasonable accommodation would cause
2 *significant difficulty or expense* to the employer.” *Id.*; and

3 d. The employer failed to provide an accommodation.

4 6.27 Here, Plaintiff MAYLONI meets the four elements in showing that Defendant
5 failed to accommodate her disability in violation of both the WLAD and the ADA.

6 a. At the time of her termination by WHBE on Oct. 15, 2015, Plaintiff MAYLONI
7 had a disability protected by the ADA: epilepsy (with further protections for the
8 exacerbation of her epilepsy symptoms due to her second pregnancy—diagnosed
9 by her treating physician).

10 b. On Oct. 15, 2015, at her ADA “interactive process” meeting with WHBE,
11 Plaintiff MAYLONI requested an extension until March 2016 of her proven-
12 successful 3-month ADA work-from-home accommodation (her second baby
13 was due March 2016 and her epilepsy symptoms were exacerbated by her
14 pregnancy, as stated by her treating physician, Dr. Au).

15 c. There was an accommodation available that would have been effective and
16 would not have posed an undue hardship to the employer – Plaintiff MAYLONI
17 continuing to work from home through Dec. 2015 when her doctor planned to
18 re-evaluate her worsening epilepsy symptoms, as exacerbated by her second
19 pregnancy.

20 i. Plaintiff MAYLONI’s work-from-home accommodation cost WHBE
21 \$0.00 to implement (as opposed to, for example, if Plaintiff MAYLONI
22 required specific equipment/ramps/hearing devices, etc. for WHBE to
23 accommodate her disability).

24 ii. Plaintiff MAYLONI’s work-from-home accommodation from July-Oct.
25
26
27
28

2015 had already proven “very successful” for WHBE (WHBE Management, Nancy Steele’s, words in Sept. 2015 re Plaintiff MAYLONI’s successful ADA accommodation for the prior 90 days).

iii. Plaintiff MAYLONI’s request in Oct. 2015 for an extension of her ADA accommodation was not for an indefinite period of time, but rather was simply a request for a 2-month extension of her existing proven-successful 90-day ADA work-from-home accommodation (in line with her doctor’s directive that Plaintiff MAYLONI be re-evaluated in Dec. 2015 to assess her epilepsy symptoms that were exacerbated by her second pregnancy).

iv. Plaintiff MAYLONI’s request for a 2-month extension of her existing proven-successful 90-day ADA work-from-home accommodation was hardly an undue hardship on WHBE in light of: (1) WHBE’s work-from-home policy adopted in December 2014; and (2) Governor Inslee’s EXECUTIVE ORDER 14-02 (March 3, 2014) encouraging WA State employers (including WHBE) to expand telework/work-from-home programs to help reduce traffic congestion and improve quality of life. These are both policies encouraging work-from-home flexibility for all employees (including non-disabled employees). Plaintiff MAYLONI, having an ADA-recognized disability (epilepsy), the symptoms of which were severely exacerbated by her second pregnancy (affording her additional protections under the ADA and WLAD), should afford Plaintiff MAYLONI even MORE flexibility to work from home than these two policies allow.

d. Lastly, in Oct. 2015, WHBE failed to offer (or even discuss) with Plaintiff MAYLONI a continued accommodation for her disabilities and instead ended her proven-successful ADA accommodation and terminated her employment on Oct. 15, 2015.

1 6.28 This compared to the flexibility that Defendant afforded to Plaintiff
2 MAYLONI's non-disabled and non-pregnant co-workers. In early-mid 2015, Defendant
3 allowed Plaintiff MAYLONI's non-disabled and non-pregnant co-workers (including Mr.
4 Mathew Holloman and Ms. Raven Castro), to work from home for multiple reasons, such as
5 them not feeling well or their children being sick. Unlike Plaintiff MAYLONI, both Mr.
6 Mathew Holloman and Ms. Raven Castro were not disabled and were not pregnant at the time
7 (either of which are the basis for disparate treatment by WHBE against epileptic and pregnant
8 Plaintiff MAYLONI, who was not only pregnant, but was also disabled due to her epilepsy).
9 WHBE manager, Ms. Erickson, singled-out Plaintiff MAYLONI from her non-disabled and
10 non-pregnant co-workers, denying Plaintiff MAYLONI work-from-home flexibility and
11 forcing Plaintiff MAYLONI to remain working full-time onsite at WHBE to cover the work
12 of a recently-terminated employee. Ms. Erickson made this decision despite that:

- 13 a. Plaintiff MAYLONI consistently achieved exceptional work performance in her
14 job duties with WHBE (as a top performer, which was she being punished and
15 singled-out with the denial of work-from-home flexibility).
- 16 b. Plaintiff MAYLONI was epileptic, known by WHBE management and co-
17 workers, as she had suffered seizures while working alongside her work-mates
18 on the cubicle floor at WHBE offices. Plaintiff MAYLONI needed the flex
19 schedule more than most other employees to better accommodate her many
20 doctor's appointments.
- 21 c. Plaintiff MAYLONI was in her third trimester of what had been a difficult
22 pregnancy, health-wise. This was made more difficult due to the fact that
23 Plaintiff MAYLONI's pregnancy exacerbated and increasingly intensified her
24 existing epilepsy symptoms. For example, Plaintiff MAYLONI developed
25 severe anxiety as she was forced by Ms. Erickson to consistently work onsite at
26 WHBE in the open-cubicle team room. Plaintiff MAYLONI's anxiety increased
27 to full-blown panic attacks, which caused her to have increased seizures, all the
28 while Ms. Erickson forced Plaintiff MAYLONI to continue working onsite until

1 Jan. 2, 2015 (when Plaintiff MAYLONI was admitted to the hospital for
2 preeclampsia).

3 6.29 Moreover, after Plaintiff MAYLONI returned from maternity leave in late
4 March 2015 (and continuing until July 2015 when Plaintiff MAYLONI's ADA
5 accommodation began), Defendant required Plaintiff MAYLONI to work onsite 100% of the
6 time, while allowing the non-disabled and non-pregnant new Senior Eligibility Specialists
7 who were hired in lieu of Plaintiff MAYLONI (Mr. Jon Rambo and Ms. Raven Castro) to
8 have work-from-home flexibility in their schedules. Additionally, when Mr. Jon Rambo and
9 Ms. Raven Castro were working onsite at WHBE, they were allowed by WHBE to take
10 several extended breaks and came and left work as they pleased.

11 WHBE did not Engage in Interactive Process

12 6.30 The WLAD and ADA each require employers to engage in an interactive
13 process with the employee to come up with an accommodation that will work. The WLAD
14 and ADA each require employers to engage in an interactive process when a disabled
15 employee requests an accommodation or when the employer recognizes the employee's need
16 for an accommodation. EEOC regulations outline the nature of the interactive process. *See* 29
17 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3). In ***Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc.***, 228 F.3d 1105, 1113 (9th Cir. 2000)
18 (vacated on other grounds, 535 U.S. 391 (2002)), the Ninth Circuit, *en banc*, described the
19 employer's role in the required mandatory "interactive process" stating:

20 [W]e join explicitly with the vast majority of our sister circuits in holding that
21 the interactive process is a mandatory rather than a permissive obligation on the
22 part of employers under the ADA and that this obligation is triggered by an
23 employee or an employee's representative giving notice of the employee's
24 disability and the desire for accommodation.

25 228 F.3d at 1114. This requirement is mirrored in Ninth Circuit pattern jury instructions, which
26 state, "to establish a defendant's duty to provide a reasonable accommodation, the plaintiff
27 must prove . . . the plaintiff requested of the defendant an accommodation due to a disability,"
28 or, in the alternative, that "the defendant knew or had reason to know that the plaintiff has a
disability, was experiencing workplace problems because of the disability; and the disability

1 prevented the plaintiff from requesting a reasonable accommodation.” 9th Cir. Instruction
2 12.7 ADA. The interactive process requires:

- 3 a. Direct communication between the employer and employee to explore in good faith
4 the possible accommodations;
- 5 b. Consideration of the employee’s request; and
- 6 c. Offering an accommodation that is reasonable and effective.

7 *Zivkovic v. S. Cal. Edison Co.*, 302 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th Cir. 2002). An employer’s duty to
8 engage in the interactive process ends when the employee requesting the accommodation fails
9 to provide medical documentation supporting his request or otherwise becomes
10 uncooperative. *Allen v. Pac. Bell*, 348 F.3d 1113, 1115–16 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to engage
11 in the interactive process is actionable. *Wright v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.*, 609 F. Appx. 918,
12 922 (9th Cir. 2015).

13 6.31 Under both federal and state law, “[r]easonable accommodation. . .envision[s] an
14 exchange between employer and employee where each seeks and shares information to
15 achieve the best match between the employee’s capabilities and available positions.”
16 *Goodman v. Boeing Co.*, 127 Wn.2d 401, 408-409, 899 P.2d 1265 (1995). To qualify for
17 reasonable accommodation under the WLAD, an impairment must be known or shown
18 through an interactive process to exist in fact, and “[t]he impairment must have a substantially
19 limiting effect upon the individual’s ability to perform his or her job, the individual’s ability
20 to apply or be considered for a job, or the individual’s access to equal benefits, privileges, or
21 terms or conditions of employment[.]” RCW 49.60.040(7)(d). “The employer has a duty to
22 determine the nature and extent of the disability, but only after the employee has initiated the
23 process by notice.” *Frisino v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1*, 160 Wn. App. 765, at 780 (Division I,
24 2011). “A reasonable accommodation requires an employer to take ‘positive steps’ to
25 accommodate an employee’s disability.” *Harrell v. Washington State ex rel. Dep’t of Soc.*
26 *Health Servs.*, 170 Wn. App. 386, 398, 285 P.3d 159 (2012). Under Washington law, the
27 accommodation must be medically necessary. *Hill v. BCTI Income Fund-I*, 144 Wn.2d 172, at
28 193 (2001).

6.32 Defendant violated the WLAD and ADA by failing to accommodate Plaintiff MAYLONI's epilepsy disability, a diagnosed disability recognized by the ADA, the symptoms of which were exacerbated by her second pregnancy in 2015 (as stated by her doctor in WHBE ADA required paperwork on June 9, 2015, and again on Oct. 1, 2015).

6.33 Plaintiff MAYLONI consistently performed the essential functions of her job and, in fact, did so *more productively* during her work-from-home ADA accommodation, as stated by WHBE in Plaintiff MAYLONI's ADA Follow-Up Meeting on August 13, 2015.

6.34 WHBE did not enter into a good faith interactive process with Plaintiff MAYLONI prior to ending her proven-successful ADA accommodation.

6.35 Rather, WHBE collected the clear directives from Plaintiff MAYLONI's doctor (dated October 1, 2015, stating that Plaintiff MAYLONI could not drive until December 2015 – pending her doctor's approval – due directly to the exacerbation of Plaintiff MAYLONI's epilepsy symptoms caused by her second pregnancy). Then, instead of following WLAD and ADA law dictating that they working interactively with Plaintiff MAYLONI to discuss options for extending her proven-successful accommodation for just two months (until Dec. 2015 when Plaintiff MAYLONI's treating doctor planned to re-evaluate her epilepsy symptoms, exacerbated by her second pregnancy), WHBE management (Nancy Steele) started the Oct. 15, 2015, "interactive process" conference call with Plaintiff MAYLONI and her attorney by saying, in regards to the news of Plaintiff MAYLONI's second pregnancy, "Wow, you're really going to have your hands full, aren't you?" Nancy Steele then told Plaintiff MAYLONI that her ADA accommodation was ending immediately and that her employment was terminated, effective immediately, due to a disability separation.

Damages under the WLAD

6.36 As a result of Defendant failing to accommodate Plaintiff MAYLONI's epilepsy disability, a diagnosed disability recognized by the WLAD, the symptoms of which were exacerbated by her second pregnancy in 2015 and the severe emotional distress that Plaintiff MAYLONI suffered as a direct result, Plaintiff MAYLONI is entitled to recover damages under the WLAD. Remedies for violation of the WLAD are broad. The WLAD

provides that: Any person deeming himself or herself injured by any act in violation of this chapter shall have a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction to enjoin further violations, or to recover the actual damages sustained by the person, or both, together with the cost of suit including reasonable attorneys' fees or any other appropriate remedy authorized by this chapter or the United States Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended... *See* RCW 49.60.030(2). The WLAD provides for an award of compensatory damages, recovery for personal injuries for emotional distress, humiliation, and pain & suffering, attorney's fees and costs.

Damages under the ADA

6.37 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) applies all powers, remedies, and enforcement provisions of Title VII to any persons alleging employment discrimination on the basis of disability. As such, Plaintiff MAYLONI is entitled to and will seek all available remedies under Title VII against Defendant, including but not limited to compensatory damages, punitive damages, back pay, lost future earnings, attorney's fees, and reasonable expert witness fees. Back pay consists of wages, salary and fringe benefits the employee would have earned during the period of discrimination to the date of trial.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION **DISCRIMINATION BASED ON SEX (PREGNANCY)** **IN VIOLATION OF WLAD (RCW 49.60) AND TITLE VII**

6.38 Under both the WLAD and Title VII, pregnancy discrimination is discrimination "because of sex."

WLAD

6.39 The WLAD "prohibits employment practices that disadvantage women because of pregnancy or childbirth." WAC 162-30-020(1). WAC 162-30-020(3)(a) provides that it "is an unfair practice for an employer, because of pregnancy or childbirth, to ... [r]efuse to hire or promote, terminate, or demote, a woman...". To reach the full scope of disadvantages faced by women because of employment policies that do not take into account this biological difference, pregnancy is defined as including, "but is not limited to, pregnancy, the potential

1 to become pregnant, and pregnancy related conditions.” WAC 162-30-020(2)(a).

2 6.40 The WLAD requires employers to provide leave during a period of pregnancy
3 or childbirth related sickness, regardless of whether the employer provides leave to other
4 employees. WAC 162-30-020(4)(a) (employers must “provide a woman a leave of absence for
5 the period of time that she is sick or temporarily disabled because of pregnancy or childbirth”
6 regardless of leave policies applicable to other employees). The prohibition of adverse
7 actions and the leave requirement appeared in WAC 162-30-020(2) and (4), WAC 162-30-
8 020(5) (1972). In 1973, although there were amendments, the provisions remained. *See* WAC
9 162-30-020(4) and (5) (1973). Subsequent amendments in 1999 provided the current version
10 of the regulation and provided the definition of “pregnancy” at WAC 162-30-020(2)(a),
11 carried the leave provision forward at WAC 162-30-020(5)(a) and (b), and replaced the
12 former adverse treatment provision with the current list of unfair practices found at WAC
13 162-30-020(3), which includes discrimination in hiring practices. WSR 99-15-025.

14 6.41 The WLAD specifically prohibits an employer from making decisions based on
15 stereotypes about pregnant women:
16

17 It is an unfair practice to base employment decisions or actions on
18 negative assumptions about pregnant women, such as:

- 19 (i) Pregnant women do not return to the job after childbirth;
- 20 (ii) The time away from work required for childbearing will
- 21 increase the employer's costs;
- 22 (iii) The disability period for childbirth will be unreasonably long;
- 23 (iv) Pregnant women are frequently absent from work due to
- 24 illness;
- 25 (v) Clients, co-workers, or customers object to pregnant women on
- 26 the job;
- 27 (vi) The terms or conditions of the job may expose an unborn fetus
- 28 to risk of harm.

WAC 162-30-020(3)(c).

1 6.42 Under the WLAD (RCW 49.60), discrimination on the basis of pregnancy
2 constitutes sex discrimination. To prove that you have been discriminated against based on
3 your sex, you must show:

- 4
- 5 a. That you are a member of a protected class (women are a protected class);
 - 6 b. That you are qualified for the employment position or of performing
 - 7 substantially equal work;
 - 8 c. That an adverse employment decision including termination or denial of
 - 9 promotion was taken against you;
 - 10 d. That the person your employer selected as a replacement or for promotion ahead
 - 11 of you is not a pregnant woman; and
 - 12 e. Washington employers must also return the woman to the same job or a “similar
 - 13 job of at least the same pay” after taking leave for disability relating to
 - 14 pregnancy or childbirth. WAC 162-30-020(4)(c). Refusal to do so must be
 - 15 justified by proven “business necessity.”

16 6.43 Here, Plaintiff MAYLONI meets the above five elements showing
17 discrimination on the basis of sex (pregnancy). Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff
18 MAYLONI based on her sex/pregnancy in violation of the WLAD when, upon learning of
19 MAYLONI’s second pregnancy on October 9, 2015, terminated her employment on Oct. 15,
20 2015. Additionally, Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff MAYLONI based on her
21 sex/pregnancy in violation of the WLAD when, in early March 2015, WHBE failed to
22 promote Plaintiff MAYLONI to a position for which she was most qualified in favor of co-
23 workers who were not disabled and not on FMLA-approved maternity leave – this was all
24 despite Plaintiff MAYLONI’s consistent dedication to the mission, values and high work
25 standards at WHBE. WHBE’s Ms. Erickson informed Plaintiff MAYLONI that the position
26 she had applied for (for which she was the most qualified candidate) was offered to two
27 candidates based on what WHBE claimed to be their “experience and demonstrated abilities
28

1 to perform the functions of this position.” However, both candidates, had been hired as entry-
 2 level “project temps” in the role of Eligibility Specialist in November 2014, and had been
 3 trained and directly managed by Plaintiff MAYLONI for the duration of their employment at
 4 WHBE.
 5

6 6.44 Additionally, Defendant violated the WLAD by stripping core job duties from
 7 Plaintiff MAYLONI’s position upon her return from maternity leave in March 2015.
 8 Washington employers must also return the woman to the same job or a “similar job of at least
 9 the same pay” after taking leave for disability relating to pregnancy or childbirth. WAC 162-
 10 30-020(4)(c).
 11

12 6.45 Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff MAYLONI based on her sex
 13 (pregnancy) in violation of the WLAD.

14 TITLE VII AND THE PDA

15 6.46 Congress enacted the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) in 1978 to make
 16 clear that discrimination based on pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions is a
 17 form of sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).
 18 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). Thus, the PDA extended to pregnancy Title VII's goals of “[achieving]
 19 equality of employment opportunities and remov[ing] barriers that have operated in the past to
 20 favor an identifiable group of . . . employees over other employees.” *See Young v. United*
 21 *Parcel Service, Inc.*, 575 U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 1338, 191 L.Ed.2d 279, 83 U.S.L.W. 4196, 25
 22 Fla.L.Weekly Fed. S 155 (2015).
 23
 24

25 6.47 In passing the PDA, Congress intended to prohibit discrimination based on “the
 26 whole range of matters concerning the childbearing process,” and gave women “the right . . .
 27 to be financially and legally protected before, during, and after [their] pregnancies.” H.R. Rep.
 28

1 No. 95-948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, *reprinted in* 5 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749, 4753 (1978). Thus,
2 the PDA covers all aspects of pregnancy and all aspects of employment, including hiring,
3 firing, promotion, health insurance benefits, and treatment in comparison with non-pregnant
4 persons similar in their ability or inability to work.

6 6.48 The PDA defines discrimination because of sex to include discrimination
7 because of or on the basis of pregnancy. As with other claims of discrimination under Title
8 VII, an employer will be found to have discriminated on the basis of pregnancy if an
9 employee's pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical condition was all or part of the
10 motivation for an employment decision. The most familiar form of pregnancy discrimination
11 is, like the present case, discrimination against an employee based on her current pregnancy.
12 Such discrimination occurs when an employer refuses to hire, fires, or takes any other adverse
13 action against a woman because she is pregnant, without regard to her ability to perform the
14 duties of the job. *See EEOC v. Ackerman, Hood & McQueen, Inc.*, 956 F.2d 944, 948 (10th
15 Cir. 1992) (clear language of PDA requires comparison between pregnant and non-pregnant
16 workers, not between men and women); *see also Palmer v. Pioneer Inn Assocs., Ltd.*, 338
17 F.3d 981, 985 (9th Cir. 2003) (employer not entitled to summary judgment where plaintiff
18 testified that supervisor told her that he withdrew his job offer to plaintiff because the
19 company manager did not want to hire a pregnant woman)

23 6.49 Close timing between the challenged action and the employer's knowledge of
24 the employee's pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical condition. In *Asmo v. Keane, Inc.*,
25 471 F.3d 588, 593-94 (6th Cir. 2006), a two-month period between the time the employer
26 learned of the plaintiff's pregnancy and the time it decided to discharge her raised an inference
27 that the plaintiff's pregnancy and discharge were causally linked.
28

6.50 Here, Defendant violated Title VII, as amended by the PDA, when it fired Plaintiff MAYLONI because she was pregnant with her second baby, without regard to her ability to perform the duties of her job at WHBE. Moreover, there exists a causal link between the challenged action (WHBE terminating Plaintiff MAYLONI'S employment) and WHBE'S knowledge of Plaintiff MAYLONI'S second pregnancy and related medical condition (her pregnancy'S exacerbation of her epilepsy symptoms).

Damages under Title VII

6.51 Plaintiff MAYLONI is entitled to and will seek all available remedies under Title VII against Defendant, including but not limited to compensatory damages, punitive damages, back pay, lost future earnings, attorney'S fees, and reasonable expert witness fees. Back pay consists of wages, salary and fringe benefits the employee would have earned during the period of discrimination to the date of trial.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

RETALIATION IN VIOLATION OF WLAD (RCW 49.60) and TITLE VII Discrimination Against Person Opposing Unfair Practice Protected by WLAD or TITLE VII

6.52 Defendant'S conduct alleged herein constitutes retaliation in violation of RCW 49.60.210(1), which prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee because he/she has opposed discriminatory practice.

6.53 The Defendant'S conduct alleged herein constitutes retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), which prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee because he/she has opposed discriminatory practice.

6.54 Plaintiff MAYLONI engaged in protected activity when she filed a Discrimination and Harassment complaint with Ms. Steele against Ms. Erickson on December

1 11, 2014; Plaintiff then became protected from retaliation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)
2 and RCW 49.60.210(1).

3
4 6.55 Following her protected activity of filing a complaint of Discrimination and
5 Harassment against WHBE on December 11, 2014, Defendant's treated Plaintiff worse than
6 other similarly situated WHBE employees outside of Plaintiff MAYLONI's protected classes
7 (*i.e.*, persons who were not disabled and who were not a pregnant woman). Defendant's
8 retaliatory adverse actions against Plaintiff MAYLONI after she complained about workplace
9 harassment and discrimination from Defendant include, but are not limited to:
10

- 11 a. On March 1, 2015, Plaintiff MAYLONI was passed over for a promotion by
12 WHBE to two available positions, in favor of far less qualified, temporary
13 employees who were outside of Plaintiff MAYLONI'S protected classes (*i.e.*, the
14 persons that WHBE hired into these two roles instead of Plaintiff MAYLONI were
15 both not disabled at the time of promotion and neither person was a pregnant
16 woman);
17
18 b. On March 31, 2015, Plaintiff MAYLONI received an unfounded negative
19 Employee Review from WHBE, immediately following her return from maternity
20 leave. The negative performance review was a surprise to Plaintiff MAYLONI,
21 given that she had never received even so much as a negative comment from
22 WHBE, much less a negative review since her hire date. Plaintiff MAYLONI had
23 consistently earned positive and/or "exceeds expectations" performance evaluations
24 from WHBE. The performance review was unfounded, providing no tangible
25 examples of how and why Plaintiff MAYLONI had not performed her job duties at
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1 or above WHBE's expectations. The performance review was pretextual for the
2 discriminatory animus of WHBE management against Plaintiff MAYLONI.
3 Defendant WHBE's stated reasons for its retaliatory negative performance review
4 of Plaintiff MAYLONI were not the true reasons for its actions, but instead were
5 pretext to hide Defendant's discriminatory animus towards Plaintiff.
6

7 c. Upon her return from maternity leave on March 30, 2015, key job responsibilities
8 that Plaintiff MAYLONI had excelled at (and even trained other employees on
9 before her maternity leave), were permanently reassigned by WHBE to
10 MAYLONI's co-workers. This significant and permanent demotion of Plaintiff
11 MAYLONI's job duties by WHBE was communicated to her immediately.
12 Plaintiff MAYLONI did not expect to have 100% of her job duties reinstated upon
13 return from maternity leave, but she also didn't expect that any reassignment of her
14 core duties would be "permanent," as communicated to her by WHBE immediately
15 upon her return from maternity leave.
16
17

18 d. On October 15, 2015, WHBE ended Plaintiff MAYLONI's proven-successful ADA
19 work-from-home accommodation and abruptly terminated Plaintiff MAYLONI's
20 employment, without discussion (interactive or otherwise) regarding possible
21 alternative accommodations for Plaintiff MAYLONI's epilepsy disability,
22 symptoms of which were exacerbated by her second pregnancy. This was despite
23 WHBE reporting to Plaintiff MAYLONI on August 13, 2015, that her work
24 productivity with WHBE has increased tremendously as a result of the
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1 accommodation and that the accommodation was, in Nancy Steele's words,
2 "viewed as a success by the agency."

3
4 6.56 Defendant's stated reasons for its adverse actions against Plaintiff MAYLONI,
5 as alleged above, were not the true reasons for their actions, but rather were pretext to hide the
6 Defendant's discriminatory animus towards Plaintiff MAYLONI.

7
8 6.57 Defendant's unlawful Retaliation against Plaintiff MAYLONI in violation of 42
9 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) and RCW 49.60.210(1) provides Plaintiff MAYLONI remedies
10 including, but not limited to, an award of compensatory damages, recovery for personal
11 injuries for emotional distress, humiliation, pain & suffering, back pay, reasonable attorney's
12 fees and costs of bringing suit.

13
14 **VII. RELIEF REQUESTED**

15 7.1 Plaintiff MAYLONI hereby realleges the substance of paragraphs I, II, III, IV,
16 V, and VI with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein.

17 7.2 Because of the Defendant's wrongful acts described above, Plaintiff MAYLONI
18 has suffered loss of wages, lost future income, lost earning ability, lost fringe benefits,
19 substantial humiliation, mental and emotional distress, and other damages to be proved at
20 trial.
21

22 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff MAYLONI respectfully requests this Court grant her relief,
23 including

24 a. Back pay for an amount to be proved at trial;

25 b. Damages for future loss, emotional distress, pain & suffering,
26 inconvenience, mental anguish & loss of enjoyment of life and any medical
27
28

1 expenses flowing therefrom, in an amount to be proved at trial;

2 c. Punitive damages because Defendant engaged in discriminatory
3 practices against Plaintiff with malice or with reckless indifference. *See* 42 U.S.C. §
4 1981(a)(2) (providing for recovery of compensatory and punitive damages against
5 defendant who violates § 102(b)(5) of ADA (42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)) by failing to
6 make reasonable accommodation)
7

8 d. The Plaintiff's reasonable attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
9 5(k), 29 U.S.C. § 626(b), and RCW 49.60.030(2);
10

11 e. Costs of suit as provided by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) and RCW
12 49.60.030(2).

13 f. Prejudgment interest at the highest lawful rate;

14 g. Tax consequences;

15 h. Lost fringe benefits; and
16

17 i. Such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and equitable.

18 **DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL**

19 Pursuant to Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff demands trial by
20 jury in this action of all issues so triable.
21

22 DATED this 27th day of October, 2017.

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